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Abstract  
Should Islamic Law be introduced into Western legal system? At the heart of the issue is a debate 
on legal pluralism, which envisions a society where different laws apply to different religious 
groups. This paper explores question using the British case of Sharia Councils. Building on the 
author’s knowledge of the situation of women in Middle Eastern and Islamic countries, she 
undertook firsthand analysis of the Islamic Sharia councils and Muslim arbitration tribunals in 
various British cities. She offers a pointed critique of legal pluralism, highlighting the type of 
Islamic law being used and its human rights ramifications. 
Keywords: Pluralism/Islamic Law/Human Rights/Women’s rights/British sharia councils/Muslim 
arbitration tribunals/ 
Resumen 
¿Debería introducirse la ley islámica en el sistema legal occidental? En el fondo de esta cuestión 
está el debate sobre la pluralidad de legislaciones, que implica la existencia de diferentes leyes 
que se aplican a diferentes grupos de una misma sociedad. Este artículo examina la cuestión 
sirviéndose del caso de los Tribunales de Sharía británicos. A partir del conocimiento de primera 
mano de la situación de las mujeres originarias de Oriente Próximo y los países islámicos, se 
analizan los Tribunales de Sharía Islámica y los tribunales musulmanes de arbitraje de varias 
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 This paper presents a segment of the results of her book published in 2016 with the title Women and Sharia Law: 
The Impact of Legal Pluralism in the UK, London, I.B. Tauris. In the book the experience of British Muslim Women and 
their diverse campaigns to end the application of Islamic Law was duly documented.  
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ciudades británicas. Se ofrece una crítica detallada de este pluralismo legislativo, descubriendo el 
tipo de ley islámica utilizada y sus ramificaciones en lo relativo a los derechos humanos. 
Palabras clave: Pluralismo Jurídico/Ley Islámica/ Derechos Humanos/ Derechos de las Mujeres/ 
Tribunales de Sharía Británicos/ 
 
Introduction 
The United Kingdom allows the application of Islamic law in family affairs in Sharia councils and 
Muslim arbitration tribunals. Muslims are not the only group that resort to their religious laws. 
Jewish and Hindu laws are also used as well. My research however focuses on the Muslim 
separate legal system that exists. 
Application of Islamic Law takes two forms, in the Sharia Councils and in the Muslim Arbitration 
Councils. The number of Sharia Councils is unknown and ranges from 35 to 85 councils.
2
 These are 
not subject to any supervision, they deny access to legal advice and legal assistance, appeals to 
their decisions are not possible and their focus is on family disputes. The majority of their 
applicants are women, who seek a religious divorce from their husbands. Muslim Arbitration 
Tribunals apply Islamic Law under the British Arbitration Act of 1996 and therefore their 
judgments are legally binding. Both parties must agree first to arbitration. There are indications 
that these tribunals, just like the councils, have turned into parallel Legal structures. They arbitrate 
on family disputes, domestic violence and even in cases of child abuse (Manea: 2016).  
Within the United Kingdom’s context, three general groups have been calling for the introduction 
of forms of Islamic law, shari’a, into British legal system:  
 
 Islamic and Islamist organisations. The terms Islamic and Islamist have different meanings. 
Islamic organisations often represent a traditional if not conservative reading of Islam, are led 
by individuals of traditional/conservative religious background, and often seek to impose a 
religious identity on ‘Muslim community’ members. Islamist organisations espouse a political 
agenda that aims to Islamise migrant communities of Islamic faith. Some Islamic organisations 
have members who espouse the ideology of Islamism and some do not. Often they work 
together and support each other’s religious demands. Together they often claim to be the sole 
representative and voice of ‘Muslim communities’ and their experts on their ‘needs’.  
 High officials, lawyers, judges or political personalities, who seem to be concerned about how 
Muslim communities are becoming integrated in their respective countries, and consider the 
move toward shari’a law inevitable if Muslims are to integrate ‘successfully’. Dr Rowan 
Williams, the former archbishop of Canterbury, is one famous example; another is Marion 
Boyd, Ontario’s attorney general. Some of these people may be calling for soft legal pluralism 
for pragmatic political reasons. They earnestly believe that combating Islamic extremism – a 
serious problem in Britain – will require giving small concessions to the Muslim community, 
such as allowing them to live by Islamic family laws. Britain’s former Lord Chief Justice Baron 
Phillips of Worth Matravers (equivalent to the chief justice of the US Supreme Court) made a 
comment that might be understood in this light. It is no coincidence that Islamic and Islamist 
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 For more information on the work of Sharia Councils See Bano, Samia (2012), Muslim Women and Shari’ah Councils: 
Transcending the Boundaries of Community and Law, London, Palgrave Macmillan. 
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organisations in Britain make the same argument: “Give us Islamic law in family affairs to curb 
extremism” (Brown: 2006).  
 Academics in a range of social science fields, specifically legal anthropology, law and sociology, 
who are leading a theoretical and intellectual discourse on legal pluralism. Legal pluralism was 
defined by Jacques Vanderlinden in 1972 as “the existence within particular society of different 
legal mechanisms applying to identical institutions” (Woodman, 1999: 4). Simply said, it is a 
system that allows religious, ethnic and cultural groups to apply their own laws within the 
state. Scholars make a distinction between two forms of legal pluralism, strong and week.
3
 
Yüksel Sezgin explains that weak legal pluralism occurs when the state “commands different  
bodies  of  law  for  different  groups  in  the  population  by  incorporating  their  normative  
orderings into the central administration of law and courts (Yüksel Sezgin, 2004: 102). Strong 
legal pluralism, on the other hand, exists when “State law is just one among many other 
normative orderings in society” (ibid). 
The debate on legal pluralism often revolves around the question: does the state have a monopoly 
on legal productions and norms, on minorities and multiculturalism? They maintain that legal 
centralism is a Western model of jurisprudence, that it ignores the experience of non-Western 
nations. They blame colonial powers for depriving people in developing countries of access to 
their own traditional and customary laws, imposing their version of positive law on their colonies. 
They cite a “more complex” relationship between law and society, one “where law is 
conceptualised as more plural, not located entirely in the state” (Yilmaz, 2005: 2).  
Accordingly, legal pluralists hold that state law is only one of many levels of law; their idea implies 
a plurality of social fields and producers of norms, which interact somewhat with each other. They 
also insist that legal pluralism is an adequate system that guarantees the protection of minorities’ 
rights and of their entitlement to be different.
4
 They insist that an even-handed sensitivity to 
difference requires an abandonment of the formal vision of equality, one that assumes that all 
citizens are inherently identical. Instead, the legal system should take cognizance of the identity 
and values of different sections of the population, no matter how distinctive these values maybe 
(Grillo et al, 2009: 25-26).  Within the British discourse on weak legal pluralism, some strong 
advocates are the American John R. Bowen, mentioned above, who is Dunbar-Van Cleve Professor 
in Sociocultural Anthropology at Washington University in St. Louis, Roger Ballard, the Director of 
the Centre for Applied South Asian Studies, and Tariq Modood, a British-Pakistani professor of 
sociology, politics and public policy at the University of Bristol.  
Members of these three groups are often of the opinion that weak legal pluralism is just one out 
of many instruments for resolving conflicts, and that it is an extension of a right already given to 
the Jewish minority: a right to arbitration tribunals in a system called Beth Din. And, they say, since 
the Jews already have it, why not Muslims as well?  
They emphasise that this instrument of conflict resolution is voluntary, that they only support it 
with safeguards that ensure respect for human rights, especially for women’s rights. Accordingly, if 
a member of a religious minority does not want to be ruled by these laws, all she or he has to do is 
to opt out and leave the community.  
And they often argue that the Western legal tradition, which is based on legal centralism and state 
monopoly over legal productions and a monistic conception of law (the basic foundation on which 
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 The first who introduced the binary distinction between strong and weak legal pluralism was Griffiths, John in 1986.  
4
 See Grillo, Ralph et al (eds) (2009), Legal Practice and Cultural Diversity, Surrey, Ashgate; Griffiths, John (1986): 
“What is Legal Pluralism?”,  Journal of Legal Pluralism, vol. 32, nr. 24; Ihsan Yilmaz (April 2002): “The challenge of post-
modern legality and Muslim legal pluralism in England”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies xxvii/2; Dupret, 
Baudoiun; Berger, Maurits Berger and al-Zwaini, Laila (eds) (1999), Legal Pluralism in the Arab World, The Hague, 
Kluwer Law International; Kemper, Michael and Reinkowski, Maurus (eds) (2005), Rechtspluralismus in der islamischen 
Welt: Gewohnheitsrecht zwischen Staat und Gesellschaft, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter. 
MANEA, Application of Islamic Law in the UK … 
 
 




liberal-democratic nations are instituted) is Euro-American centric and  ignores the experience of 
non-Western nations. 
Those calling for soft legal pluralism in the UK are often shaped by strong or weak cultural 
relativism. The strong cultural relativists hold that “culture is the principal source of the validity of 
a moral right or rule *…+ the presumption is that rights (and other social practices, values, and 
moral rules) are culturally determined” (Donnelly, 1984: 401). The weak cultural relativists, on the 
other hand, assert that “culture may be an important source of the validity of a moral right or rule. 
Universality is initially presumed, but the relativity of human nature, communities, and rights 
serves as a check on potential excesses of universalism” (Donnelly, 1984: 401). 
Absent from this plead for the introduction of Islamic law is the actual experience with legal 
pluralism in non-Western countries specifically with its often grave political and human rights 
consequences. Also absent is clarity about the type of Islamic law being used in this so-called 
method of conflict resolution. No one considers the social context within which this law is being 
implemented. The diversity and multitude of positions towards Islamic law, the critical discourse in 
Islamic countries among civil society actors and intellectuals, and their attempts to change Islamic 
laws: none of this seems to be relevant to their discourse. Indeed, the discourse is very academic 
and theoretical, ignoring the settings or circumstances within which women are living in closed 
societies. It is as if Muslim women, Muslims and Islam itself had been crafted and constructed 
separate from their historical, political, social and religious contexts.  
Also absent from their discourse is an awareness of the role that two forms of Islamism - societal 
and political - plays in promoting this development, or of their totalitarian agenda.  
Islamic Law and Universal Human and Women’s Rights 
I tend to avoid using expressions like divine law or God’s law to describe shari’a. There are 
different approaches to defining it. One approach would be similar to the way Ramadan and with 
him Williams tried to distinguish between shari’a as the ‘expression of the universal principles of 
Islam’ and shari’a as fiqh: the ‘doctrinal traditions developed by jurists over centuries.’ This 
definition by distinction has a particular purpose: to make space for new interpretations of Islamic 
law by emphasising the limited authority of the fiqh and to create space for others to contribute to 
developing norms for fiqh in a changing world. (Emon, 2012: 8-9).  
Another approach would avoid defining shari’a in legally philosophical terms and would focus 
more on studying the sources that are understood to constitute the corpus of shari’a, especially on 




The first approach, while it deserves our applause, ignores how Islamic law is being implemented 
in reality. It also reinforces the constructed perception that shari’a is indeed God’s law, and has 
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 Shari-a is derived from four sources: 1) the Qur’an, compiled into a written text approximately 30 years after the 
death of Mohammad; 2) the Sunna, the sayings and deeds of Mohammad, compiled in a written form approximately 
200 years after his death; 3) Ijma, the consensus of legal jurists on an issue; and 4) Qiyas, analogy: “a jurist concluding 
from a given principle embodied in a precedent that a new case falls under this principle or is similar to this precedent 
on the strength of a common essential feature called the reason”. Qiyas is often considered similar to ijtihad, defined 
as independent juristic reasoning and a technique for such reasoning. However, the gates of ijtihad were supposed to 
have been closed after the ninth century. For more information please see An-Na’im, 1990: 19-25. 
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thus far failed to acknowledge the limits of religious interpretations. Put simply, trying to avoid 
acknowledging the human nature of religious texts, including the Qur’an, makes any attempts at 
reform futile and holds those texts captive within specific religious boundaries. In addition, we 
must recognise the historical nature of many Quranic verses, like those that see wife-beating as a 
disciplinary action, or that allow a man to have female slaves in addition to four wives, or to kill 
‘unbelievers’, or to engage in corporal punishment. And we must also state clearly that these 
interpretations can no longer be seen as appropriate in a modern society. Unless the advocates of 
this approach recognise these differences, such an approach will be both superficial and ad hoc – 
and will fail to address the problems inherent in the legal side of Islam.  
The approach I adopt here, which is closer to the second one mentioned above, defines shari’a by 
the way it is being implemented in Islamic states and within Muslim family laws. I see it as a 
selection from the corpus of legal opinions of jurists developed over the course of Islamic history, 
especially between the seventh and tenth centuries.  
Looking at shari’a from this perspective will highlight its problematic nature, for we are not 
considering its theoretical potential to provide justice. What we are in fact looking at is its actual 
implementation and hence its obvious limitations and how it contravenes modern concepts of 
human rights. What matters is how it is being interpreted and used today, not how it could be 
used a century from now.  
I deliberately used the word modern above, because – let me repeat – the jurisprudence 
suggested and under consideration was developed between the seventh and tenth centuries. This 
historical period, early in the development of Islam as a whole, shaped its content and its 
perception of women’s role in society, and is reflected in its worldview of what constitutes a 
human and who can enjoy human rights. 
In fact, if we look at the actual corpus of Islamic law, human rights can be defined as the privilege 
“only of persons of full legal capacity”. A person of full legal capacity is “a living human being of 
mature age, free *not a slave+, and of Moslem faith”. Under this definition, others who lived in the 
Islamic state, including non-Moslems and slaves, were “only partially protected by law or had no 
legal capacity at all” (Khadduri, 1946: 79). This definition was formulated in 1946 by Majid 
Khadduri, an Iraqi-born American academic recognised as a leading authority on Islamic law and 
the modern political history of the Middle East. 
More than fifty years later, that definition was qualified by Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, a leading 
Sudan-born American authority on Islamic law and human rights. In 1990, he accepted Khadurri’s 
statement as “substantially accurate” and added a qualification concerning the status of Muslim 
women. He acknowledged that Muslim women “have full legal capacity under Shari’a in relation to 
civil and commercial law matters”, but they “do not enjoy human rights on an equal footing with 
Muslim men under Shari’a” (An-Na’im, 1990: 171). 
What does that mean?  
It means that in addition to creating a stratified citizenry dominated by free male Muslims, the 
way shari’a dealt with the status of women was often contradictory, offering women some rights 
but withholding many others, while maintaining the notion that the Muslim man is the keeper and 
guardian of the Muslim woman.  
In general, one can discern two levels of statements in the Qur’an regarding women’s status. The 
first level treats women and men as equal before God – that is, in the afterlife. For example, one 
verse states ‘Whoso does evil will be requited only with the like of it; but whoso does good, 
whether male or female, and is a believer – these will enter the paradise; they will be provided 
therein without measure.’ (Qur’an 40:41) 
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Qur’anic verses at the second level place women at a legal disadvantage. These are the statements 
on issues of family and sexual relations, rules of marriage, divorce, custody, maintenance, 
inheritance and testimony – that is, rights within this life. On these issues, Qur’anic verses reflect 
the social tribal patriarchal context of the seventh-century Arabian Peninsula, specifically the city 
of Medina. They favoured men and accorded women a lower and dependent legal status. From 
this we see the clear inconsistencies on the status of women between the Qur’anic provisions and 
the modern statements on human rights, such as the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW).  
Let us start with the first part of An-Na’im’s qualification. He says that under shari’a, a Muslim 
woman has full legal capacity in relation to matters of civil and commercial law. This means that 
she can own property as a separate person and that when she marries she can keep her name. 
Hence when I married, I kept my family name, Manea, and did not take my husband’s name. Nor 
did he take over whatever property I had. It remained in my possession. From this perspective, a 
Muslim woman is treated as an individual.  
Yet An-Na’im is also correct to state that, under shari’a, Muslim women do not enjoy human rights 
on an equal footing with Muslim men. In fact shari’a laws contravene various provisions of human 
rights conventions, specifically the UDHR and the CEDAW mentioned above.  
Human rights conventions are clear in their statements about the equality of man and woman. 
The essence of their worldview is expressed by Article One of the 1948 UDHR: that all human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. This principle paved the ground for Article 16 
of the same declaration and Article 16 of CEDAW. Both articles envisioned marriage and family 
relations as an equal partnership that would be entered, shared and dissolved by both man and 
woman on equal footing. Marriage should be entered by two persons of full age, with their free 
and full consent, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion. The spouses should 
have same rights and responsibilities with regard to guardianship of children, and the same 
personal rights as husband and wife, including the right to choose a family name, a profession and 
an occupation. And both spouses should have the same rights in respect of the ownership, 
acquisition, management, administration, enjoyment and disposition of property, whether free of 
charge or for a valuable consideration. 
This is not the case in the world view of classical Islamic law: woman is part of a hierarchical social 
structure dominated by the man at the top; and as a legal person the woman is controlled before 
her marriage by her male guardian and after marriage by her husband.  
The rules regarding marriageable age and guardianship make child marriages and forced marriages 
possible, and rules on divorce and maintenance rights discriminate against the wife.  
In fact, the Islamic law’s view towards the position of the wife within marriage can be easily 
discerned by considering the legal term used for marriage – a term, remember, that was 
developed in the Middle Ages.  
In Islamic law, the term for marriage is nikah, which literally means carnal union. Jurists describe 
nikah as “an agreement, which results in the lawful enjoyment of a woman” (Shukri, 1996: 21). 
The reference to enjoyment applies only to the husband, because that right belongs especially and 
pre-eminently to him. In fact, the husband is entitled to intercourse with his wife at his pleasure. 
On the other hand, two realities restrict the wife’s right to enjoyment. First, she has no right to 
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claim intercourse with her husband, except for one time after marriage, and second, she may have 
to share him with other wives (Shukri, 1996: 21). 
This perception of marriage is not theoretical. In fact it has been used repeatedly in various Islamic 
and Arab family laws, such as those in Yemen, Kuwait and Syria. All of them state in their first 
article that marriage is a legal union or a contract that gives the man the legal permission to access 
his wife sexually. The only time this definition has changed has been in genuine attempts to 
reform the classic Islamic law on family relations. For example, the Moroccan Family Code of 2004 
states, ’Marriage is a legal contract by which a man and a woman mutually consent to unite in a 
common and enduring conjugal life.’6 
Common provisions of Islamic Law Regarding Marriage and Divorce 
Aside from the legal definition of marriage, classical Islamic law does not envision marriage and 
family relations as an equal partnership between man and woman. In the paragraphs below I 
summarise the common provisions regarding marriage and divorce.  
1. Marriage and its Dissolution 
Age of marriage: A Muslim man or a woman must be of sound mind and must have attained 
puberty to be considered legally eligible for marriage. In classical Islamic law, puberty occurs with 
the physical signs of maturity such as the emission of semen for boys and menstruation for girls 
(Büchler and Schlatter, 2013: 37-74).  
Guardianship: In contracting a marriage, male guardianship is necessary. The established 
interpretations of Islamic jurisprudence schools insist that a woman cannot marry without the 
consent of her male guardian. A guardian handles all kinds of affairs for both his male and female 
wards, including contracting marriage. When the ward is a male, the guardianship ceases when 
the boy reaches puberty. For a girl, however, a guardian has the power to impose a marriage on a 
virgin girl without her knowledge or consent (Manea, 2009: 34). If she contracts a marriage 
without her guardian’s consent, the marriage is not valid. If she was divorced, her consent, in 
addition to that of the guardian, is necessary to contract the marriage.  
The one crucial exception to this rule in Sunni Islam occurs in the Hanafite school of jurisprudence; 
it is also present in Shi’a jurisprudence. Guardianship is required when the girl is not of age, that is, 
has not yet reached puberty. But once she reaches puberty, she is allowed to contract her 
marriage without her guardian’s consent.7 However, under Hanafite jurisprudence, if the guardian 
is not satisfied with her choice of husband, he has the right to demand that marriage be annulled 
on the basis of lack of kafaa: social equality. The concept of kafaa, literally suitability, gives the 
guardian the right to dissolve and annul a marriage, if he considers the groom/husband not to be 
fit or suitable. 
Polygamy: A Muslim man may be married up to four wives at the same time but a Muslim woman 
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 Yemen’s Family Law No. 20, 1992 states in Article 1: “Marriage is a union between the couple by a legal charter; it 
gives the man legal permission to access the woman (sexually), and together they establish a family based on good 
companionship”. Kuwaiti Personal Status Law, No. 51, 1984, states in Article 1: “Marriage is a contract between a man 
and a woman. [With it] a woman becomes legally (sexually) accessible to the man; and its aim is settlement, chastity, 
and the strength of the nation”. The Syrian Islamic Personal Status Law, No. 59, 1953, says in Article 1: “Marriage is a 
contract between a man and a woman. [With it] a woman becomes legally accessible to the man (sexually); and its 
aim is building a mutual life bond and children”. This perception of marriage does change, however, when the Islamic 
law is reformed as with the case of the reformed Moroccan Family Code (Moudawana) of 2004, which states in Article 
4 that “Marriage is a legal contract by which a man and a woman mutually consent to unite in a common and 
enduring conjugal life. Its purpose is fidelity, virtue and the creation of a stable family, under the supervision of both 
spouses according to the provisions of this Moudawana”.  
7
 Some of the Twelver Shi’a jurists added the condition that for a woman to enjoy this right, she should previously 
have been married. For more details on the jurisprudences positions on guardianship see Hallaq, 2007: 274-276.  
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can only be married to one man at a time. A Muslim man may marry a Christian or a Jewish 
woman, but a Muslim woman may not marry a non-Muslim man. 
Divorce: A Muslim man may divorce his wife, or any of his wives, by unilateral repudiation, talaq, 
without having to give any reasons or justify his action to any person or authority. When he 
divorces his wife by uttering the word three times, the divorce is considered irrevocable: bain. In 
order to return to him, she must first marry a different man and get a divorce from the new 
husband.  
A Muslim woman can obtain a divorce in three ways: a) by gaining the consent of her husband; b) 
by getting a judicial decree for limited specific grounds/harms; or 3) by khula. This means a divorce 
sanctioned by a judge, but she must give up her financial rights to gain it. 
A woman divorced by her husband must observe a waiting period (iddah), normally lasting three 
months. During this period she cannot marry another man. 
A divorce in which the word is uttered fewer than three times is revocable (raji`i). So even if a 
woman gets a divorce, her husband may change his mind. During the waiting period, he has the 
right to return her to his household against her will and he need not sign another marriage 
contract. One reference on fiqh explained this rule this way: “until the period of iddah has elapsed, 
the repudiation is revocable (raji’i), and the husband may resume conjugal relations with his wife, 
if he be so inclined, by a revocation of the repudiation. This he can do whether she be willing or 
not” (Shukri, 1996: 97). 
Obedience, Maintenance, and Beating: Obedience is considered a duty of the wife. A wife should 
be obedient to her husband insofar as his commands are legally allowed and are ordained as 
duties of marriage. If a wife is disobedient, she loses her right to maintenance. According to Hanafi 
jurisprudence, a wife is considered disobedient if she leaves their home without the consent of her 
husband or without a lawful excuse. Other schools of jurisprudence, however, say that even if she 
stays at home, she will not be entitled to maintenance if she refuses sexual intercourse (Shukri, 
1996: 81; Pearl, 1979: 65). A husband may beat his wife if she is disobedient. The husband can 
resort to several measures when his wife disobeys him, the last of which is the most severe: 
beating her. If the woman obeys him, then he should stop using these measures (Manea, 2009: 
141-143).  
Maintenance after Divorce: Maintenance for a divorced wife ceases after the iddah period, the 3-
month waiting period after the divorce.  
After a divorce, the wife is only entitled to the sum of money set in the marriage contract: the 
muakhar.  
Custody of Children: After a divorce, the custody of a child is entrusted to either the mother or 
father, depending on the child’s age and sex. Younger children tend to be placed in the mother’s 
care and the father takes over custody when the child reaches a given age. However, shari’a 
makes a distinction between custody and guardianship: the father is the guardian of the child after 
separation even if the mother is granted the right to custody up to a certain age, after which 
custody reverts to the father (Mallat, 2007: 357). 





2. Inheritance Law and Testimony 
Inheritance: A Muslim woman receives less than the share of a Muslim man when both parties 
have an equal degree of relationship to the deceased person. Hence, a sister inherits from her 
father half of what her brother inherits. A Muslim husband inherits half of what his wife leaves, 
provided that she did not have a son. If she does, then the husband inherits a quarter. A Muslim 
wife inherits a quarter of her husband’s estate if he has no son. If he has a son, then she inherits 
an eighth (Abu Zahra, 1963: 122, 131; An-Na’im, 1990: 176).  
Being of a different religion is a total bar to inheritance. Thus a Muslim may neither inherit from, 
nor leave an inheritance to, a non-Muslim (An-Na’im, 1990: 176).  
Testimony: The testimony of two women equals that of one man. Originally this rule was meant 
for financial affairs; but the jurists expanded the rule and made it a general rule.  
These discriminatory provisions are not theoretical. They shape the perception of women’s rights 
in Islamic charters on human rights. In fact Article 6 of the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in 
Islam reflects the classical Islamic view of law in a literal sense. A woman is equal to a man in 
human dignity but not in human rights. She has her own civil entity and financial independence 
and the husband is responsible for her maintenance. Yet this financial responsibility of the 
husband is inherently connected to the wife’s obedience.  
By the same token, the practice of letting theological interpretations influence decisions on family 
affairs takes two forms in the Arab MENA region. First, some countries, including Egypt, Bahrain, 
Lebanon, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, have no unified personal status code, so the issue is left entirely 
to the judiciary, “which is heavily influenced by the conservative nature of classical Islamic 
jurisprudence”8.  
In Egypt, for example, several personal status laws exist, some dating back to the 1920s. However, 
in cases where the law contains no textual provision, recourse is made to the established views of 
the Sunni Hanafi school of jurisprudence. Rulings made in accordance with those views could 
contradict the spirit of the current era and human rights. One famous example is the 1995 ruling, 
upheld by the Court of Cassation or Supreme Court, ordering the Egyptian scholar Nasr Hamid Abu 
Zaid to divorce his wife, against his will or hers, on the ground that he committed apostasy in 




Second, other Arab states, including Jordan, Algeria, Kuwait, Yemen and Syria, have codified 
provisions of Islamic jurisprudence into a unified law that applies to Muslims.  
Family laws may be less discriminatory in some Arab countries than in others. As a rule, personal 
status laws in North Africa are more progressive than those in the Arab Middle East. In fact, 
Tunisia, and to a lesser extent Morocco, stand as examples of how such laws can be reformed in a 
way that mostly reflects the concept of gender equality.  
Notwithstanding the above, certain characteristics are common to family law in all Arab states, 
with Tunisia and Morocco again the exceptions. These include the notion that men are women’s 
keepers and have a degree of command over their lives. This notion has been translated into 
several laws that are relevant here: laws obliging husbands to support their wives financially while 
commanding their wives to obey them, laws that grant men alone the right to unilaterally divorce 
their wives and the right to require their return in the event of revocable divorce, and laws 
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Hence, a woman may have the right to be elected to parliament or be chosen as a minister in a 
Arab government cabinet, yet this very parliamentarian or minister may not be allowed to travel 
outside the country with a government delegation if her husband withholds his permission. If you 
think this situation is only theoretically possible, think again. A female Arab minister mentioned it 
to me during an interview.  
It should be mentioned at this point that the family laws of Islamic states differ in the minimum 
age of marriage. Some countries with codified systems legislate minimum ages for marriage and 
set restrictions on child marriage.
11
 For example, in Bangladesh, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco the 
minimum age for girls is set at 18. Other countries set a very low minimum age or none at all. In 
Syria, that age is 15, in Iran 13, in Sudan 10. And in Yemen and Saudi Arabia there is no minimum 
age for marriage.  
In addition, some of the laws that set a minimum age of 18 are full of loopholes and the provisions 
are rarely accessed. The weaknesses in the law and its implementation often result in a wide gap 
between the legal minimum age of marriage and the minimum age practised in communities. 
Hence, some families take advantage of the loopholes that give judges leeway to allow underage 
girls to marry at the request of their guardians. And other families bypass the law by arranging a 
religious marriage ceremony for their underage daughter and then wait until she is 18 to officially 
register the marriage. If the marriage is not registered and the husband decides to leave, the child 
bride is left without any legal protection for herself and her children (WLUML, 2006; Roudi-Famimi 
and Ibrahim, 2013). This situation does not only occur in Egypt or Jordan. It happens in Britain as 
well.  
Application of Islamic Law in Sharia Councils and Muslim Arbitration Councils 
Which brings me to the question: What type of Islamic law is being implemented within Britain’s 
shari’a courts? The short answer is: the classical Islamic law with all its contradictions and 
discrimination.  
The five “judges” I interviewed who are involved with these tribunals stated that they rely on one 
of the four classical types of Sunni jurisprudence. The Muslim Arbitration Tribunal uses the Hanafi 
jurisprudence by default, but does refer to the others at times. When a person of Shi’a background 
comes to them, they apply the Shi’a jurisprudence on her/his case.  
To them, what they are applying is not only fiqh, the jurists’ traditions. They are applying what 
they think of literally as God’s Law, the law of Allah. Hence, depending on the type of shari’a court 
applying this law, it can either seek a fundamentalist interpretation of fiqh, or it can try to make 
the lives of women easier by seeking the most lenient interpretation. But the mindset is framed by 
the perception that shari’a is God’s law and therefore better than any other secular law. The 
mindset is also shaped by the acceptance of the rules I mentioned above, that regulate marriage, 
divorce, polygamy, guardianship, inheritance, etc., anything related to family affairs and women’s 
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Ibrahimi, 2013: 1-7.  
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position within the family. They accept these rules and do not question them. Hence during my 
interviews with the five “judges”, including the female judge, they reflected their perception that 
this is what Islam commands, this is what God commands, and we are following God’s law.  
Those interviewed are not interested in considering modern ijtihad, rational independent juristic 
reasoning. If you bring up examples of it, like Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, the well-known Muslim 
scholar who studies human rights and Islamic law, or the Moroccan Family Code of 2004, which 
used ijtihad as a means to reform family law in a way that would integrate gender equality, or if 
you allude to the evolutionary nature of fiqh, the doctrinal traditions developed by jurists over 
centuries, their reaction would be a polite rebuff. Or it might be a clear-cut answer like this one 
from Sheikh Faizul Aqtab Siddiqi, the director of the Muslim Arbitration Council
12
:  
Sheikh Siddiqi: I do not disagree with the idea of ijtihad and qiyas [independent juristic reasoning 
and one of its techniques and analogies]. This is our forte. We have to do ijtihad. But no ijtihad can 
cancel the direct rule of God, the hukum of Allah. This is not possible. There cannot be any 
evolution of the direct rules, ahkam. For example, the rule of corporal punishment – cutting off 
the hands – hukum of had – can be suspended due to certain social circumstances, but cannot be 
terminated as barbaric or irrelevant to modern society. I do not think so. I am a firm believer in 
corporal punishment, hudud, but in the right social environment.  
Manea: And what is the right social environment?  
Sheikh Siddiqi: Equal distribution of wealth, there is full education within the community, 
there are the people who are believers, momeneen, people who are living according to 
true belief in Allah and they are leading their lives to please Allah. In those circumstances, 
where they have no excuse whatsoever but to accept the rules of Shari’a, hukum al 
shariah, then in those circumstances, if there is a transgression then I believe the corporal 
punishments, hudud, should be implemented. 
Within this mindset, the jurists’ traditions somehow seem to become sacred in these 
judges’ minds; they reflect a ‘divine wisdom’ that transcends our understanding. Naturally 
this leads them to apply the classical Islamic law to the letter, picking and choosing as they 
want from within that pool of traditions.  
Consider the issue of the proper age for marriage. Sheikh Siddiqi of the Muslim Arbitration 
Tribunal is clear regarding this issue
13
: 
Sheikh Siddiqi: In my view, puberty is the right age. But puberty is the minimum age; then 
the next criterion is the decision of the guardian, he has to make the decision. Because in 
some societies, 12- or 13-year-old women, girls, they are more or less fully fledged women, 
they are fully functional, and you in Western societies, *…+ are having babies, they are 
having sex, so they are fully grown and fully mature; there are some 12-year-olds that are 
not in that condition, they are very weak, they are not fully functional as women, and they 
do not want to get married. So it is the job of the wali, the guardian, to ensure that the girl 
is protected and the girl is not subjected to a marriage in this situation where her personal 
circumstances do not allow this marriage to take place.  
Again, we see classical Islamic jurisprudence being used as a point of reference in these courts.  
The guardianship issue clearly illustrates this point. As we saw above, Sheikh Siddiqi considers that 
the guardian knows best for his ward. Dr Mohammad Shahoot Kharfan, of the Muslim Welfare 
House, demands that the bride and the groom and the guardian be present at the wedding 
ceremony. But to contract the marriage, the guardian has to approve. One example he gave me 
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was of a woman in her thirties who wanted to marry. Dr Kharfan asked for her guardian to 
contract the marriage. When she told him he lives in another country, he called him to get his 
approval and to ask him to delegate his right of guardianship to another person, a male of course. 
When I asked Dr Kharfan if her voice was not enough, his answer was matter-of-fact: “the 
guardian is present, the guardian is present”14, meaning, we have a guardian here, and he will 
decide.  
By the same token, Hanafi jurisprudence allows the guardian to annul the marriage of his female 
ward if he is not satisfied with her choice of the groom, and the people I interviewed consider this 
provision valid. In fact, it has been used and applied in the Islamic Shari’a Council, Leyton, and the 
Birmingham Islamic Shari’a Council of the Central Mosque. As I said before, the latter is considered 
to be supportive of women’s needs.  
The following transcript of the interview I conducted with Sheikh Suhaib Hasan, of the ISC in 
Leyton, exemplifies what I mean about a mindset that leads people to apply the classical Islamic 
law to the letter, picking and choosing as one likes from within a pool of outdated traditions.  





Sheikh Hasan: You see this is the beauty of this council that you have all forms of ideas 
[schools of jurisprudence], and we try to pick the idea which is more acceptable and more 
appropriate for the Muslim masses living in this country *…+ When it comes to the 
guardian, wali, we know that most of the people here come from India and Pakistan and 
most of the Muslim community is from a Hanafi background. And in Hanafi jurisprudence, 
they allow an adult woman to conduct her marriage without the knowledge of her wali 
[the guardian+. But one thing *…+ that people do not know *is+ that the guardian, the wali, is 
allowed to ask for faskh, the invalidation [dissolution] of the marriage on two grounds: one, 
that this woman has married someone who is not equal to her status, that is kuuf’, 
suitable, [kafaa+…. The second *is if+ she has accepted a dower amount which is far less 
than the dower amount accepted in her house. For example, her sister got 500 pounds, her 
cousin got 500 pounds, and she only accepted 10 pounds, so the guardian has the right to 
go to the judge – qadi – and say, ‘I challenge this marriage on one of these two grounds.’ 
So he can invalidate this marriage.  
Manea: But have you encountered such cases?  
Sheikh Hasan: Many.  
Manea: Really? 
Sheikh Hasan: Yes, yes. But [suppose] the man is coming from a Shafii [jurisprudence] 
background, [then] there is no problem, because the Shafii, they say, there is no nikah 
[marriage contract] without a guardian, wali, and a witness, the Shafii believe in that, the 
Hanbali and Maliki [jurisprudences] believe in that. [Then,] if they are coming from this 
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background and they are saying this marriage was conducted without a guardian, wali, 
then there is no problem to invalidate it, easy. So we can invalidate it easily.  
Manea: But have you really had a case where the father said, I don’t accept the marriage of 
my daughter? 
Sheikh Hasan: Yes. We had [such a] case. And [the father] strongly contested [his daughter 
choosing her own husband+ *…+ If the woman is also ready to invalidate the marriage, then 
it is no problem. You [just] say your father is asking and you are willing. The problem is that 
[this woman] does not want to invalidate [her marriage] and she is attached to this boy and 
the father is asking for the invalidation of this marriage. We told the father, you have these 
two grounds; if you can prove to us that she is married to someone *not+ equal to her, *…+ 
or she has accepted a very low dower amount, then we can invalidate it, and we did 
invalidate some marriages on this ground.  
Sheikh Mohammad Talha Bokhari of the Birmingham council does not question the validity 
of this provision: he says the guardian has the right to invalidate a marriage if the groom is 
considered unfit. Nonetheless, he says they try to implement this rule in a more ‘sensitive’ 
manner – if one can use that adjective. He explained to me16:  
Sheikh Bokhari: *…+ the Hanafi jurisprudence gives the right – the haq – to the guardian – 
the wali – to object to the marriage, haq al Kafaa, *…+ because she has married a man who 
was a source of shame for their family. But [this role is only valid] up to [a point]. As a rule, 
if the girl is not pregnant, kafaa is possible. If the girl has become pregnant then his 
guardianship has [expired]. This is the Hanafi ideology for this matter. And mostly it is 
suitable in this situation in this world.  
Manea: And have you had cases like this?  
Bokhari. Yes.  
Manea: Really? Could you give me an example?  
Sheikh Bokhari: For example, a lady came; she was nearly 29 and she found someone and 
that person has become Muslim. The husband was not born Muslim. She was from Somali 
and the husband was from Ghana. The father was not happy with that [because the 
husband was from Ghana] and objected to this marriage. And [we asked him] why have 
you objected. Because he is Muslim, thank God, and according to Islam he has all the rights 
that a Muslim has. He *the father+ said ‘but he is from Ghana, I do not like it.’ I said this not 
legal; *the father’s position+ is not a matter of Islam, because Islam says all *Muslims+ are 
equal. He is a Muslim. Because he is doing a very good job as a bank manager and she was 
very happy, the father said ok. *…+ And she has become pregnant. And we said your 
objection is annulled. You have lost your right to kafaa and guardianship [because of her 
pregnancy].  
Conclusions 
It is a mindset – a mindset that does not belong to the twenty-first century. A mindset that does 
not see harm in beating a wife. It is how one is beating his wife that seems to be under question: 
one should not harm the woman by hitting her on the face, nor should he leave marks on her 
body. In fact, if one follows the ‘correct’ example of the Prophet, one should use toothpicks to hit 
her: ‘How much will she get hurt from the toothpick (miswak)?’ Or ‘you can make a knot in her 
scarf’ and hit her with it: ‘How much can a person feel from that?’ For the main purpose of beating 
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is to hurt her feelings, not her body.
17
 Of course, if the husband beats her ‘savagely’ then that is a 
ground for divorce.  
Consistency in logic is not a feature of this mindset or these outdated laws.  
When a law tells us that the rights of a child or a woman are irrelevant, that it is ‘ok’ to force a 
child or woman to marry, or to simply ignore her choice and wish to remain married and annul her 
marriage because her guardian has a legal right to do so, when a law tells us that man and woman 
are not equal in dignity and rights, when a law makes it possible to violate a woman’s dignity and 
strip her of her equal rights, then it is incumbent on us to take a difficult step and make a 
judgement: these are bad laws by today’s standards. They have no place in a modern society. It is 
our duty to make that judgement.  
Cultural relativism cannot justify a child marriage, cannot justify forcing a woman to marry and 
cannot justify beating a wife. Doing so is a matter of domestic violence in any language. Using 
Islamic jargon will not make it tolerable. Using a culturally relativist argument about group rights 
or religious rights to justify the application of such rules is not only shameful. It is outrageous.  
Women and men in Islamic countries have been fighting to change and modernise these laws. Yet, 
to the essentialists, their struggle seems irrelevant, inconsequential.  The essentialists would 
prefer to bring in a religious law, snatched out of its medieval social and historical and 
geographical contexts, and apply it today in the middle of Britain. They think they are protecting 
“Muslims’ rights”. After all, that is what the ‘Muslims’ want. Well, perhaps it is time to ask this 
question: Who is speaking in the name of Muslims, and whose rights will be protected here?  
Given this discrepancy, you might understand why I have little sympathy for the voices calling for 
the introduction of Islamic law in family affairs in European and North American societies. It is the 
consequences of such calls that one should examine to understand how dangerous they could be 
to concepts of gender equality and women’s and children’s rights. In fact, these voices are actually 
calling for the legitimization of systematic discrimination against women and children. And such 
discrimination will certainly not help any successful integration of migrants’ communities of 
Islamic faith. Indeed, it will only lead to the cementation of closed parallel societies, with two 
types of women, Western women who enjoy their rights according to the state’s laws, and 
migrants’ women who do not.  
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